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DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY USING IMPRECISE
PROBABILITIES
MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES
Abstract. Various ways for decision making with imprecise probabilities—admissibility, max-
imal expected utility, maximality, E-admissibility, Γ-maximax, Γ-maximin, all of which are
well-known from the literature—are discussed and compared. We generalize a well-known
sufficient condition for existence of optimal decisions. A simple numerical example shows how
these criteria can work in practice, and demonstrates their differences. Finally, we suggest an
efficient approach to calculate optimal decisions under these decision criteria.
1. Introduction
Often, we find ourselves in a situation where we have to make some decision d, which we
may freely choose from a set D of available decisions. Usually, we do not choose d arbitrarily
in D: indeed, we wish to make a decision that performs best according to some criterion, i.e.,
an optimal decision. It is commonly assumed that each decision d induces a real-valued gain
Jd: in that case, a decision d is considered optimal in D if it induces the highest gain among all
decisions in D. This holds for instance if each decision induces a lottery over some set of rewards,
and these lotteries form an ordered set satisfying the axioms of von Neumann Morgenstern [1],
or more generally, the axioms of for instance Herstein and Milnor [2], if we wish to account for
unbounded gain.
So, we wish to identify the set opt (D) of all decisions that induce the highest gain. Since, at
this stage, there is no uncertainty regarding the gains Jd, d ∈ D, the solution is simply
opt (D) = argmax
d∈D
Jd. (1)
Of course, opt (D) may be empty; however, if the set {Jd : d ∈ D} is a compact subset of R—this
holds for instance if D is finite—then opt (D) contains at least one element. Secondly, note that
even if opt (D) contains more than one decision, all decisions d in opt (D) induce the same gain
Jd; so, if, in the end, the gain is all that matters, it suffices to identify only one decision d
∗ in
opt (D)—often, this greatly simplifies the analysis.
However, in many situations, the gains Jd induced by decisions d in D are influenced by
variables whose values are uncertain. Assuming that these variables can be modelled through
a random variable X that takes values in some set X (the possibility space), it is customary to
consider the gain Jd as a so-called gamble on X , that is, we view Jd as a real-valued gain that is
a bounded function of X , and that is expressed in a fixed state-independent utility scale. So, Jd
is a bounded X–R-mapping, interpreted as an uncertain gain: taking decision d, we receive an
amount of utility Jd(x) when x turns out to be the realisation of X . For the sake of simplicity,
we shall assume that the outcome x of X is independent of the decision d we take: this is called
act-state independence. What decision should we take?
Irrespective of our beliefs about X , a decision d in D is not optimal if its gain gamble Jd is
point-wise dominated by a gain gamble Je for some e in D, i.e., if there is an e in D such that
Key words and phrases. decision, optimality, uncertainty, probability, maximality, E-admissibility, maximin,
lower prevision.
2 MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES
Je(x) ≥ Jd(x) for all x ∈ X and Je(x) > Jd(x) for at least one x ∈ X : choosing e guarantees a
higher gain than choosing d, possibly strictly higher, regardless of the realisation of X . So, as a
first selection, let us remove all decisions from D whose gain gambles are point-wise dominated
(see Berger [3, Section 1.3.2, Definition 5 ff., p. 10]):
opt≥ (D) := {d ∈ D : (∀e ∈ D)(Je 6≥ Jd or Je = Jd)} (2)
where Je ≥ Jd is understood to be point-wise, and Je 6≥ Jd is understood to be the negation
of Je ≥ Jd. The decisions in opt≥ (D) are called admissible, the other decisions in D are called
inadmissible. Note that we already recover Eq. (1) if there is no uncertainty regarding the gains
Jd, i.e., if all Jd are constant functions of X . When do admissible decisions exist? The set
opt≥ (D) is non-empty if {Jd : d ∈ D} is a non-empty and weakly compact subset of the set
L(X ) of all gambles on X (see Theorem 3 further on). Note that this condition is sufficient, but
not necessary.
In what follows, we shall try to answer the following question: given additional information
about X , how can we further reduce the set opt≥ (D) of admissible decisions? The paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the classical approach of maximising expected utility,
and explains why it is not always a desirable criterion for selecting optimal decisions. Those
problems are addressed in Section 3, discussing alternative approaches to deal with uncertainty
and optimality, all of which attempt to overcome the issues raised in Section 2, and all of which are
known from the literature. Finally, Section 4 compares these alternative approaches, and explains
how optimal decisions can be obtained in a computationally efficient way. A few technical results
are deferred to the appendix, where we, among other things, generalize a well-known technical
condition on the existence of optimal decisions.
2. Maximising Expected Utility?
In practice, beliefs about X are often modelled by a (possibly finitely additive) probability
measure µ on a field F of subsets of X , and one then arrives at a set of optimal decisions by
maximising their expected utility with respect to µ; see for instance Raiffa and Schlaifer [4,
Section 1.1.4, p. 6], Levi [5, Section 4.8, p. 96, ll. 23–26], or Berger [3, Section 1.5.2, Paragraph I,
p. 17]. Assuming that the field F is sufficiently large such that the gains Jd are measurable with
respect to F—this means that every Jd is a uniform limit of F -simple gambles—the expected
utility of the gain gambles Jd is given by:
Eµ(Jd) :=
∫
Jddµ,
where we take for instance the Dunford integral on the right hand side; see Dunford [6, p. 443,
Sect. 3], and Dunford and Schwartz [7, Part I, Chapter III, Definition 2.17, p. 112]—this linear
integral extends the usual textbook integral (see for instance Kallenberg [8, Chapter 1]) to case
where µ is not σ-additive. Recall that we have assumed act-state independence: µ is independent
of d.
As far as it makes sense to rank decisions according to the expected utility of their gain
gambles, we should maximise expected utility:
opt
Eµ
(D) := arg max
d∈opt≥(D)
Eµ(Jd). (3)
When do optimal solutions exist? The set opt
Eµ
(D) is guaranteed to be non-empty if {Jd : d ∈
D} is a non-empty and compact subset of the set L(X ) of all gambles on X , with respect to
the supremum norm. Actually, this technical condition is sufficient for existence with regard to
all of the optimality conditions we shall discuss further on. Therefore, without further ado, we
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shall assume that {Jd : d ∈ D} is non-empty and compact with respect to the supremum norm.
A slightly weaker condition is assumed in Theorem 5, in the appendix of this paper.
Unfortunately, it may happen that our beliefs about X cannot be modelled by a probability
measure, simply because we have insufficient information to identify the probability µ(A) of every
event A in F . In such a situation, maximising expected utility usually fails to give an adequate
representation of optimality.
For example, let X be the unknown outcome of the tossing of a coin; say we only know that
the outcome will be either heads or tails (so X = {H,T }), and that the probability of heads lays
between 28% and 70%. Consider the decision set D = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the gain gambles
J1(H) = 4, J1(T ) = 0,
J2(H) = 0, J2(T ) = 4,
J3(H) = 3, J3(T ) = 2,
J4(H) =
1
2 , J4(T ) = 3,
J5(H) =
47
20 , J5(T ) =
47
20 ,
J6(H) =
41
10 , J6(T ) = −
3
10 ,
Clearly, opt≥ (D) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and
opt
Eµ
(D) =


{2}, if µ(H) < 25 ,
{2, 3}, if µ(H) = 25 ,
{3}, if 25 < µ(H) <
2
3 ,
{1, 3}, if µ(H) = 23 ,
{1}, if µ(H) > 23 .
Concluding, if we have no additional information about X , but still insist on using a particular
(and necessarily arbitrary) µ, which is only required to satisfy 0.28 ≤ µ(H) ≤ 0.7, we find that
opt
Eµ
(D) is not very robust against changes in µ. This shows that maximising expected utility
fails to give an adequate representation of optimality in case of ignorance about the precise value
of µ.
3. Generalising to Imprecise Probabilities
Of course, if we have sufficient information such that µ can be identified, nothing is wrong
with Eq. (3). We shall therefore try to generalise Eq. (3). In doing so, following Walley [9], we
shall assume that our beliefs about X are modelled by a real-valued mapping P defined on a—
possibly only very small—set K of gambles, that represents our assessment of the lower expected
utility P(f) for each gamble f in K;1 note that K can be chosen empty if we are completely
ignorant. Essentially, this means that instead of a single probability measure on F , we now
identify a closed convex setM of finitely additive probability measures µ on F , described by the
linear inequalities
(∀f ∈ K)(P (f) ≤ Eµ(f)). (4)
We choose the domain F of the measures µ sufficiently large such that all gambles of interest, in
particular those in K and the gain gambles Jd, are measurable with respect to F . Without loss
1The upper expected utility of a gamble f is P(f) if and only if the lower expected utility of −f is −P(f).
So, for any gamble f in K, P(−f) = −P(f), and therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to
lower expected utility.
4 MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES
of generality, we can assume F to be the power set of X , although in practice, it may be more
convenient to choose a smaller field.
For a given F -measurable gamble g, not necessarily in K, we may also derive a lower expected
utility E
P
(g) by minimising Eµ(g) subject to the above constraints, and an upper expected
utility EP (g) = −EP (−g) by maximising Eµ(g) over the above constraints. In case X and K
are finite, this simply amounts to solving a linear program.
In the literature, M is called a credal set (see for instance Giron and Rios [10], and Levi [5,
Section 4.2, pp. 76–78], for more comments on this model), and P is called a lower prevision
(because they generalise the previsions, which are fair prices, of De Finetti [11, Vol. I, Section 3.1,
pp. 69–75]).
The mapping E
P
obtained, corresponds exactly to the so-called natural extension of P (to
the set of F -measurable gambles), where P(f) is interpreted as a supremum buying price for f
(see Walley [9, Section 3.4.1, p. 136]). In this interpretation, for any s < P(f), we are willing to
pay any utility s < P(f) prior to observation of X , if we are guaranteed to receive f(x) once x
turns out to be the outcome of X . The natural extension then corresponds to the highest price
we can obtain for an arbitrary gamble g, taken into account the assessed prices P(f) for f ∈ K.
Specifically,
E
P
(g) = sup
{
α+
n∑
i=1
λiP(fi) : α+
n∑
i=1
λifi ≤ g
}
, (5)
where α varies over R, n over N, λ1, . . . , λn vary over R
+, and f1, . . . , fn over K.
It may happen thatM is empty, in which case E
P
is undefined (the supremum in Eq. (5) will
always be +∞). This occurs exactly when P incurs a sure loss as a lower prevision, that is, if
we can find a finite collection of gambles f1, . . . , fn in K such that
∑n
i=1 P(fi) > sup [
∑n
i=1 fi],
which means that we are willing to pay more for this collection than we can ever gain from it,
which makes no sense of course.
Finally, it may happen that E
P
does not coincide with P on K. This points to a form of
incoherence in P : this situation occurs exactly when we can find a finite collection of gambles
f0, f1, . . . , fn and non-negative real numbers λ1, . . . , λn, such that
α+
n∑
i=1
λifi ≤ f0, but also P(f0) < α+
n∑
i=1
λiP(fi).
This means that we can construct a price for f0, using the assessed prices P(fi) for fi, which is
strictly higher than P(f0). In this sense, EP corrects P , as is apparent from Eq. (5).
Although the belief model described above is not the most general we may think of, it is
sufficiently general to model both expected utility and complete ignorance: these two extremes
are obtained by taking M either equal to a singleton, or equal to the set of all finitely additive
probability measures on F (i.e., K = ∅). It also allows us to demonstrate the differences between
different ways to make decisions with imprecise probabilities on the example we presented before.
In that example, the given information can be modelled by, say, a lower prevision P on
K = {IH ,−IH}, defined by P(IH) = 0.28 and P(−IH) = −0.7, where IH is the gamble defined
by IH(H) = 1 and IH(T ) = 0. For this P , the set M corresponds exactly to the set of all
probability measures µ on F = {∅, {H}, {T }, {H,T }}, such that 0.28 ≤ µ(H) ≤ 0.7. We also
easily find for any gamble f on X that
E
P
(f) = min{0.28f(H) + 0.72f(T ), 0.7f(H) + 0.3f(T )}.
3.1. Γ-Maximin and Γ-Maximax. As a very simple way to generalise Eq. (3), we could take
the lower expected utility E
P
as a replacement for the expected utility Eµ (see for instance
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Gilboa and Schmeidler [12], or Berger [3, Section 4.7.6, pp. 215–223]):
opt
E
P
(D) := arg max
d∈opt≥(D)
E
P
(Jd); (6)
this criterion is called Γ-maximin, and amounts to worst-case optimisation: we take a decision
that maximises the worst expected gain. For example, if we consider the decision as a game
against nature, who is assumed to choose a distribution inM aimed at minimizing our expected
gain, then the Γ-maximin solution is the best we can do. Applied on the example of Section 2,
we find as a solution opt
E
P
(D) = {5}.
In case K = ∅, i.e., in case of complete ignorance about X , it holds that E
P
(f) = infx∈X f(x).
Hence, in that case, Γ-maximin coincides with maximin (see Berger [3, Eq. (4.96), p. 216]),
ranking decisions by the minimal (or infimum, to be more precise) value of their gain gambles.
Some authors consider best-case optimisation, taking a decision that maximises the best ex-
pected gain (see for instance Satia and Lave [13]). In our example, the “Γ-maximax” solution is
opt
EP
(D) = {2}.
3.2. Maximality. Eq. (3) is essentially the result of pair-wise preferences based on expected
utility: defining the strict partial order >µ on D as d >µ e whenever Eµ(Jd) > Eµ(Je), or
equivalently, whenever Eµ(Jd − Je) > 0, we can simply write
opt
Eµ
(D) = max>µ
(
opt≥ (D)
)
,
where the operator max>µ (·) selects the >µ-maximal, i.e., the >µ-undominated elements from
a set with strict partial order >µ.
Using the supremum buying price interpretation, it is easy to derive pair-wise preferences from
P : define >P as d >P e whenever EP (Jd − Je) > 0. Indeed, EP (Jd − Je) > 0 means that we
are disposed to pay a strictly positive price in order to take decision d instead of e, which clearly
indicates strict preference of d over e (see Walley [9, Sections 3.9.1–3.9.3, pp. 160–162]). Since
>P is a strict partial order, we arrive at
opt>P (D) :=max>P
(
opt≥ (D)
)
={d ∈ opt≥ (D) : (∀e ∈ opt≥ (D))(EP (Je − Jd) ≤ 0)} (7)
as another generalisation of Eq. (3), called maximality. Note that >P can also be viewed as a
robustification of >µ over µ in M. Applied on the example of Section 2, we find opt>P (D) =
{1, 2, 3, 5} as a solution.
Note that Walley [9, Sections 3.9.2, p. 161] has a slightly different definition: instead of
working from the set of admissible decisions as in Eq. (7), Walley starts with ranking d > e if
E
P
(Jd − Je) > 0 or (Jd ≥ Je and Jd 6= Je), and then selects those decisions from D that are
maximal with respect to this strict partial order. Using Theorem 3 from the appendix, it is easy
to show that Walley’s definition of maximality coincides with the one given in Eq. (7) whenever
the set {Jd : d ∈ D} is weakly compact. This is something we usually assume to ensure the
existence of admissible elements; in particular, weak compactness is assumed in Theorem 5 (see
appendix). The benefit of Eq. (7) over Walley’s definition is that Eq. (7) is easier to manage in
the proofs in the appendix.
3.3. Interval Dominance. Another robustification of >µ is the strict partial ordering ⊐P de-
fined by d ⊐P e whenever EP (Jd) > EP (Je); this means that the interval [EP (Jd),EP (Jd)] is
completely on the right hand side of the interval [E
P
(Je),EP (Je)]. The above ordering is there-
fore called interval dominance (see Zaffalon, Wesnes, and Petrini [14, Section 2.3.3, pp. 68–69]
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for a brief discussion and references).
opt
⊐P
(D) :=max⊐P
(
opt≥ (D)
)
={d ∈ opt≥ (D) : (∀e ∈ opt≥ (D))(EP (Je) ≤ EP (Jd))} (8)
The resulting notion is weaker than maximality: applied on the example of Section 2, opt
⊐P
(D) =
{1, 2, 3, 5, 6}, which is strictly larger than opt>P (D).
3.4. E-Admissibility. In the example of Section 2, we have shown that opt
Eµ
(D) may not be
very robust against changes in µ. Robustifying opt
Eµ
(D) against changes of µ in M, we arrive
at
optM (D) :=
⋃
µ∈M
opt
Eµ
(D) ; (9)
this provides another way to generalise Eq. (3). The above criterion selects those admissible
decisions in D that maximize expected utility with respect to at least one µ in M; i.e., they
select the E-admissible (see Good [15, p. 114, ll. 8–9], or Levi [5, Section 4.8, p. 96, ll. 8–20])
decisions among the admissible ones. We find optM (D) = {1, 2, 3} for the example.
In case µ is defined on ℘(X ) and µ({x}) > 0 for all x ∈ X , then every E-admissible decision
is also admissible, and hence, in that case, optM (D) gives us exactly the set of E-admissible
options.
4. Which Is the Right One?
Evidently, it is hard to pinpoint the right choice. Instead, let us ask ourselves: what properties
do we want our notion of optimality to satisfy? Let us summarise a few important guidelines.
Clearly, whatever notion of optimality, it seems reasonable to exclude inadmissible decisions.
For ease of exposition, let’s assume that the inadmissible decisions have already been removed
from D, i.e., D = opt≥ (D); this implies in particular that optM (D) gives us the set of E-
admissible decisions.
Now note that, in general, the following implications hold:
Γ-maximax Γ-maximin
E-admissible maximal
interval dominance
❄
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥ ❄
✲
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥ ❄
as is also demonstrated by our example. A proof is given in the appendix, Theorem 1.
E-admissibility, maximality, and interval dominance have the nice property that the more
determinate our beliefs (i.e., the smaller M), the smaller the set of optimal decisions. In con-
tradistinction, Γ-maximin and Γ-maximax lack this property, and usually only select a single
decision, even in case of complete ignorance. However, if we are only interested in the most pes-
simistic (or most optimistic) solution, disregarding other reasonable solutions, then Γ-maximin
(or Γ-maximax) seems appropriate. Utkin and Augustin [16] have collected a number of nice
algorithms for finding Γ-maximin and Γ-maximax solutions, and even mixtures of these two.
Seidenfeld [17] has compared Γ-maximin to E-admissibility, and argued against Γ-maximin in
sequential decision problems.
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If we do not settle for Γ-maximin (or Γ-maximax), should we choose E-admissibility, maximal-
ity, or interval dominance? As already mentioned, interval dominance is weaker than maximality,
so in general we will end up with a larger (and arguably too large) set of optimal options. As-
suming the non-admissible decisions have been weeded, a decision d is not optimal in D with
respect to interval dominance if and only if
EP (Jd) < sup
e∈D
E
P
(Je). (10)
Thus, if D has n elements, interval dominance requires us to calculate 2n natural extensions,
and make 2n comparisons, whereas for maximality, by Eq. (7), we must calculate n2−n natural
extensions, and perform n2−n comparisons—roughly speaking, each natural extension is a linear
program in m (size of X ) variables and r (size of K) constraints, or vice versa if we solve the
dual program. So, comparing maximality and interval dominance, we face a tradeoff between
computational speed and number of optimal options.
However, this also means that interval dominance is a means to speed up the calculation of
maximal and E-admissible decisions: because every maximal decision is also interval dominant,
we can invoke interval dominance as a first computationally efficient step in eliminating non-
optimal decisions, if we eventually opt for maximality or E-admissibility. Indeed, eliminating
those decisions d that satisfy Eq. (10), we will also eliminate those decisions that are neither
maximal, nor E-admissible.
Regarding sequential decision problems, we note that dynamic programming techniques can-
not be used when using interval dominance (see De Cooman and Troffaes [18]), and therefore,
since dynamic programming yields an exponential speedup, maximality and E-admissibility are
certainly preferred over interval dominance once dynamics enter the picture.
This leaves E-admissibility and maximality. They are quite similar: they coincide on all
decision sets D that contain two decisions. In case we consider larger decision sets, they coincide
if the set of gain gambles is convex (for instance, if we consider randomised decisions). As already
mentioned, E-admissibility is stronger than maximality, and also has some other advantages over
maximality. For instance, 15J2 +
4
5J3 >P J5, so, choosing decision 2 with probability 20% and
decision 3 with probability 80% is preferred to decision 5. Therefore, we should perhaps not
consider decision 5 as optimal.
E-admissibility is not vulnerable to such argument, since no E-admissible decision can be
dominated by randomized decisions: if for some µ ∈ M it holds that Eµ(Jd − Je) ≥ 0 for all
e ∈ D, then also
Eµ
(
Jd −
n∑
i=1
λiJei
)
=
n∑
i=1
λiEµ (Jd − Jei) ≥ 0
for any convex combination
∑n
i=1 λiJei of gain gambles, and hence, it also holds that
E
P
(
n∑
i=1
λiJei − Jd
)
≤ 0
which means that no convex combination
∑n
i=1 λiJei can dominate Jd with respect to >P .
A powerful algorithm for calculating E-admissible options has been recently suggested by
Utkin and Augustin [16, pp. 356–357], and independently by Kikuti, Cozman, and de Campos
[19, Sec. 3.4]. If D has n elements, finding all (pure) E-admissible options requires us to solve n
linear programs in m variables and r + n constraints.
As we already noted, through convexification of the decision set, maximality and E-admissibility
coincide. Utkin and Augustin’s algorithm can also cope with this case, but now one has to con-
sider in the worst case n! linear programs, and usually several less: the worst case only obtains
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if all options are E-admissible. For instance, if there are only ℓ E-admissible pure options, one
has to consider only at most ℓ! + n− ℓ of those linear programs, and again, usually less.
In conclusion, the decision criterion to settle for in a particular application, depends at least
on the goals of the decision maker (what properties should optimality satisfy?), and possibly also
on the size and structure of the problem if computational issues arise.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix is dedicated to proving the connections between the various optimality criteria,
and existence results mentioned throughout the paper. In the whole appendix, we assume the
following:
Recall, D denotes some set of decisions, and every decision d ∈ D induces a gain gamble
Jd ∈ L(X ), where L(X ) is the set of all gambles (bounded X–R mappings).
P denotes a lower prevision, defined on a subset K of L(X ). With F we denote a field on
X such that all gain gambles Jd and gambles in K are measurable with respect to F , i.e., are a
uniform limit of F -simple gambles. F could be for instance the power set of X .
P is assumed to avoid sure loss, and E
P
is its natural extension to the set of all F -measurable
gambles. M is the credal set representing P , as defined in Section 3. We will make deliberate use
of the properties of natural extension (for instance, superadditivity: E
P
(f+g) ≥ E
P
(f)+E
P
(g),
and hence also E
P
(f−g) ≤ E
P
(f)−E
P
(g)). We refer to Walley [9, Sec. 2.6, p. 76, and Sec. 3.1.2,
p. 123] for an overview and proof of these properties.
We use the symbol µ for an arbitrary finitely additive probability measure on F , and Eµ
denotes the Dunford integral with respect to µ. This integral is defined on (at least) the set of
all F -measurable gambles.
A.1. Connections between Decision Criteria.
Theorem 1. The following relations hold.
opt
EP
(D) ⊆ optM (D) ⊆ opt>P (D) ⊆ opt⊐P (D)
opt
E
P
(D) ⊆ opt>P (D)
Proof. Let J = {Jd : d ∈ D}.
Suppose that d is Γ-maximax in D: Jd maximises EP in max≥(J ). Since EP is the upper
envelope ofM, and M is weak-* compact (see Walley [9, Sec. 3.6]), there is a µ in M such that
EP (Jd) = Eµ(Jd). But, Eµ(Je) ≤ EP (Je) ≤ EP (Jd) = Eµ(Jd), for every Je ∈ max≥(J ) because
d is Γ-maximax. Thus, d belongs to optM (D).
Suppose that d ∈ optM (D): there is a µ in M such that Jd maximises Eµ in max≥(J ). But
then, because E
P
is the lower envelope ofM, E
P
(Je−Jd) ≤ Eµ(Je−Jd) = Eµ(Je)−Eµ(Jd) ≤ 0
for all Je in max≥(J ). Hence, by Eq. (7) on p. 5, d must be maximal.
Suppose that d is maximal. Then, again by Eq. (7), E
P
(Je − Jd) ≤ 0 for all Je in max≥(J ).
But, E
P
(Je) − EP (Jd) ≤ EP (Je − Jd), hence, also EP (Je) ≤ EP (Jd) for all Je in max≥(J ),
which means that d belongs to opt
⊐P
(D).
Finally, suppose that d is Γ-maximin: Jd maximises EP in max≥(J ). But then EP (Je−Jd) ≤
E
P
(Je)−EP (Jd) ≤ 0 for all Je in max≥(J ); d must be maximal. 
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A.2. Existence. We first prove a technical but very useful lemma about the existence of optimal
elements with respect to preorders; it’s an abstraction of a result proved by De Cooman and
Troffaes [18]. Let’s start with a few definitions.
A preorder is simply a reflexive and transitive relation.
Let V be any set, and let Q be any preorder on V . An element v of a subset S of V is called
Q -maximal in S if, for all w in S, w Q v implies v Q w. The set of Q -maximal elements is
denoted by
maxQ (S) :=
{
v ∈ S : (∀w ∈ S)(w Q v =⇒ v Q w)
}
. (11)
For any v in S, we also define the up-set of v relative to S as
↑SQv := {w ∈ S : w Q v}.
Lemma 2. Let V be a Hausdorff topological space. Let Q be any preorder on V such that for
any v in V, the set ↑VQv is closed. Then, for any non-empty compact subset S of V, the following
statements hold.
(i) For every v in S, the set ↑SQv is non-empty and compact.
(ii) The set maxQ (S) of Q -maximal elements of S is non-empty.
(iii) For every v in S, there is a Q -maximal element w of S such that w Q v.
Proof. (i). Since Q is reflexive, it follows that v Q v, so ↑SQv is non-empty. Is it compact?
Clearly, ↑SQv = S∩↑
V
Qv, so ↑
S
Qv is the intersection of a compact set and a closed set, and therefore
↑SQv must be compact too.
(ii). Let S ′ be any subset of the non-empty compact set S that is linearly ordered with respect
to Q . If we can show that S ′ has an upper bound in S with respect to Q , then we can infer
from a version of Zorn’s lemma [20, (AC7), p. 144] (which also holds for preorders) that S has a
Q -maximal element. Let then {v1, v2, . . . , vn} be an arbitrary finite subset of S ′. We can assume
without loss of generality that v1 Q v2 Q · · · Q vn, and consequently ↑
S
Qv1 ⊆ ↑
S
Qv2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ ↑
S
Qvn.
This implies that the intersection
⋂n
k=1 ↑
S
Qvk = ↑
S
Qv1 of these up-sets is non-empty: the collection
{↑SQv : v ∈ S
′} of compact and hence closed (V is Hausdorff) subsets of S has the finite intersection
property. Consequently, since S is compact, the intersection
⋂
v∈S′ ↑
S
Qv is non-empty as well,
and this is the set of upper bounds of S ′ in S with respect to Q . So, by Zorn’s lemma, S has a
Q -maximal element: maxQ (S) is non-empty.
(iii). Combine (i) and (ii) to show that the non-empty compact set ↑SQv has a maximal element
w with respect to Q . It is then a trivial step to prove that w is also Q -maximal in S: we must
show that for any u in S, if u Q w, then w Q u. But, if u Q w, then also u Q v since w Q v by
construction. Hence, u ∈ ↑SQv, and since w is Q -maximal in ↑
S
Qv, it follows that w Q u. 
The weak topology on L(X ) is simply the topology of point-wise convergence. That is, a net
fα in L(X ) converges weakly to f in L(X ) if limα fα(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ X .
Theorem 3. If J = {Jd : d ∈ D} is a non-empty and weakly compact set, then D contains at
least one admissible decision, and even more, for every decision e in D, there is an admissible
decision d in D such that Jd ≥ Je.
Proof. It is easy to derive from Eq. (2) that
opt≥ (D) = {d ∈ D : (∀e ∈ D)(Je ≥ Jd =⇒ Jd ≥ Je)}.
Hence, a decision is admissible in D exactly when its gain gamble is ≥-maximal in J . We must
show that J has ≥-maximal elements.
By Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that, for every f ∈ L(X ), the set Gf = {g ∈ L(X ) : g ≥ f}
is closed with respect to the topology of point-wise convergence.
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Let gα be a net in Gf , and suppose that gα converges point-wise to g ∈ L(X ): for every
x ∈ X , limα gα(x) = g(x). But, since gα(x) ≥ f(x) for every X , it must also hold that g(x) =
limα gα(x) ≥ f(x). Hence, g ∈ Gf . We have shown that every converging net in Gf converges to
a point in Gf . Thus, Gf is closed. This establishes the theorem. 
Let’s now introduce a slightly stronger topology on L(X ). This topology has no particular
name in the literature, so let’s just call it the τ -topology. It is determined by the following
convergence.
Definition 4. Say that a net fα in L(X ) τ-converges to f in L(X ), if
(i) limα fα(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ X (point-wise convergence), and
(ii) limαEP (|fα − f |) = 0 (convergence in EP (| · |)-norm).
This convergence induces a topology τ on L(X ): it turns L(X ) into a locally convex topological
vector space, which also happens to be Hausdorff. A topological basis at 0 consists for instance
of the convex sets
{f ∈ L(X ) : EP (|f |) < ǫ and f(x) < δ(x)},
for ǫ > 0, and δ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X . It has more open sets and more closed sets than the
weak topology, but it has less compact sets than the weak topology. On the other hand, this
topology is weaker than the supremum norm topology, so it has fewer open and closed sets, and
more compact sets, compared to the supremum norm topology. Note that in case X is finite,
it reduces to the weak topology, which is in that case also equivalent to the supremum norm
topology.
Note that E
P
, EP , and Eµ for all µ ∈M, are τ -continuous, simply because
EP (|fα − f |) ≥ |EP (fα)−EP (f)|,
EP (|fα − f |) ≥ |EP (fα)−EP (f)|, and
EP (|fα − f |) ≥ |Eµ(fα)−Eµ(f)|
(see Walley [9, p. 77, Sec. 2.6.1(l)]). We will exploit this fact in the proof of the following theorem,
generalising a result due to Walley [9, p. 161, Sec. 3.9.2].
Theorem 5. If J = {Jd : d ∈ D} is non-empty and compact with respect to the τ-topology, then
the following statements hold.
(i) opt
Eµ
(D) is non-empty for all µ ∈ M.
(ii) opt
E
P
(D) is non-empty.
(iii) opt
EP
(D) is non-empty.
(iv) opt>P (D) is non-empty.
(v) opt
⊐P
(D) is non-empty.
(vi) optM (D) is non-empty.
Proof. (i). Introduce the following order on L(X ): say that f Q g whenever Eµ(f) ≥ Eµ(g).
Let’s first show that, for all f ∈ L(X ), the set Gf = {g ∈ L(X ) : g Q f} is τ -closed.
Let gα be a net in Gf , and suppose that gα τ -converges to g ∈ L(X ). Since the integral Eµ
is τ -continuous, it follows that Eµ(g) = limα Eµ(gα) ≥ Eµ(f). Concluding, g belongs to Gf . We
have established that every converging net in Gf converges to a point in Gf . Thus, Gf is τ -closed.
By Lemma 2, it follows that J has at least one Q -maximal element Je, that is, Je maximises
Eµ in J . Since any τ -compact set is also weakly compact, there is a ≥-maximal element Jd in
J such that Jd ≥ Je, by Theorem 3. But then, Eµ(Jd) ≥ Eµ(Je), and hence, Jd also maximises
Eµ in J . Because Jd is ≥-maximal in J , it also maximises Eµ in max≥(J ). This establishes
that d belongs to opt
Eµ
(D): this set is non-empty.
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(ii). Introduce the following order on L(X ): say that f Q g whenever E
P
(f) ≥ E
P
(g).
Continue along the lines of (i), using the fact that E
P
is τ -continuous.
(iii). Again along the lines of (i), with f Q g whenever EP (f) ≥ EP (g).
(iv)&(v)&(vi). Immediate, by (iii) and Theorem 1. 
References
[1] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press,
1944.
[2] I. N. Herstein, J. Milnor, An axiomatic approach to measurable utility, Econometrica 21 (2) (1953) 291–297.
[3] J. O. Berger, Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis, 2nd Edition, Springer, 1985.
[4] H. Raiffa, R. Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision Theory, MIT Press, 1961.
[5] I. Levi, The Enterprise of Knowledge. An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance, MIT Press,
Cambridge, 1983.
[6] N. Dunford, Integration in general analysis, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 37 (3) (1935)
441–453.
[7] N. Dunford, J. T. Schwartz, Linear Operators, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1957.
[8] O. Kallenberg, Foundations of Modern Probability, 2nd Edition, Probability and Its Applications, Springer,
2002.
[9] P. Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, Chapman and Hall, London, 1991.
[10] F. J. Giron, S. Rios, Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: A more realistic approach to decision making?, in: J. M.
Bernardo, J. H. DeGroot, D. V. Lindley, A. F. M. Smith (Eds.), Bayesian Statistics, University Press,
Valencia, 1980, pp. 17–38.
[11] B. De Finetti, Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment, Wiley, New York, 1974–5, two
volumes.
[12] I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior, Journal of Mathematical Economics
18 (2) (1989) 141–153.
[13] J. K. Satia, J. Roy E. Lave, Markovian decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations
Research 21 (3) (1973) 728–740.
[14] M. Zaffalon, K. Wesnes, O. Petrini, Reliable diagnoses of dementia by the naive credal classifier inferred from
incomplete cognitive data, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 29 (1–2) (2003) 61–79.
[15] I. J. Good, Rational decisions, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 14 (1) (1952) 107–114.
[16] L. V. Utkin, T. Augustin, Powerful algorithms for decision making under partial prior information and general
ambiguity attitudes, in: F. G. Cozman, R. Nau, T. Seidenfeld (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International
Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications, 2005, pp. 349–358.
[17] T. Seidenfeld, A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Gamma-
maximin versus E-admissibility, Synthese 140 (1–2) (2004) 69–88.
[18] G. de Cooman, M. C. M. Troffaes, Dynamic programming for deterministic discrete-time systems with
uncertain gain, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 39 (2–3) (2004) 257–278.
[19] D. Kikuti, F. G. Cozman, C. P. de Campos, Partially ordered preferences in decision trees: Computing
strategies with imprecision in probabilities, in: R. Brafman, U. Junker (Eds.), Multidisciplinary IJCAI-05
Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling, 2005, pp. 118–123.
[20] E. Schechter, Handbook of Analysis and Its Foundations, Academic Press, San Diego, 1997.
Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Pittsburgh, PA 15213,
US
E-mail address: matthias.troffaes@gmail.com
